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IDENTITY OF BELARUSIANS AND UKRAINIANS – SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Ryszard Radzik
Modern identity of European societies has its roots in the renaissance. It was from the renaissance that the process of distinguishing between private and social identities began to develop steadily, and for a long time mainly among the elites, for that matter. Social identity manifested itself in one’s self-image as a member of the group, in sharing values recognized by the group, in the awareness of being the same as others. Private identity, in turn, stems from an awareness of one’s uniqueness, difference within the group, of an individualized contribution to the group’s culture. It has, thus, a distinctly creative, even non-conformist, character. It was developing in European societies along with individualism whose growth was influenced by Protestantism, the urban middle class with its ethos of steady work, law-abiding and trust for non-personal principles of action. The demise of the feudal local communities, especially rural ones, exposing them to the world at large, and especially the evolution of capitalism – market economy founded on the idea of continuous competition of individuals for material wealth – were all major factors contributing to the dynamic of the growth of individualism. All these processes were additionally boosted by secularization of societies and by the emergence of an idea of civil society as a collective of free individuals cooperating with one another in common economic and political interest, on the foundation of non-personal law and commonly accepted rules of social trust. Such processes of private identity formation were hindered by – on the one hand – emergence of communism and, on the other hand, nationalism, especially in its fascist version.
It does not imply, however, that national ideology was inherently anti-individualist. This ideology contributed to building modern societies since the onset of the Enlightenment, and it had an important role in creating modern market capitalism. It had a distinctly collective dimension – it thus strengthened the modern social identity – and, at the same time, when devoid of its fundamentalist, nationalist aspect, it accepted non-conformist positions and supported an individual creative activity. It can be partly explained by the fact that the idea of the nation was founded on the assumption of competition between nations, and such a competition inspired non-conformist and creative behavior, thus not only collectivity but also individualism, not only a relative stability of cultural foundations of the nation, but also change bringing about chances for success in competing with other nations.
The development of individualism, and thus of private identity, was supported more by Latin denominations (especially Protestantism), rather than the Orthodox church; a rapid development of capitalism rather than vestiges of feudalism; numerous urban population (headed by strong middle class), rather than peasantry (headed by nobility, and later intelligentsia), the formation of a political nation (based on the idea of state as a collectivity of citizens), rather than of cultural nation (based on the ethnic-linguistic foundation). Therefore, these are more democracies of the western type resting on bourgeois mentality and ethos and capitalist economy, on liberalism structured on a strong foundations of national values, rather than communism which grew out of the will to rapidly overcome the vestiges of feudalism and out of the opposition against inequality inherent in capitalism. Communism with its distinct Oriental dimension – collectivist and anti-liberal (in opposition to socialist democracy which, inspired also by Marx, went in a different direction, because the cultural conditions of marxist ideology in Berlin, Paris or London were different than in Beijing or Moscow).
Undoubtedly, the growth of individualism, and of private identity with it, and, of identity in general, stimulated the dynamics of the development of European and North American societies and was one of the main causes of their civilizational success. It does not mean, however, that it did not have negative outcomes. Nonetheless, creative nonconformity stemming from the pain of alienated individuals, and their strongly delineated identity were an important determining factor for economic, scientific and cultural achievements of the North Atlantic civilization. In the communist Eastern and Central Europe the social reality in general, and economic reality in particular were under the influence of ideology. As a result, the success of an individual depended to a large extent on one’s degree of conformity, and not from features which would mostly collide with conformity, such as solidity, reliability, dutifulness, responsibility for oneself, conscientious work, innovativeness. The masses became increasingly unwilling to develop social activity, the tendency was to escape into the private life of one’s family and narrow circles of friends. The official public world turned out alien, which is particularly observable on the example of Belarus and Ukraine, which were under a heavier ideological pressure than Poland. The division into ‘us’ – the close people of everyday family and friends contacts, and ‘them’ – strangers in the street, shop and an administration office was much deeper in these two countries. The circle of ‘us’ was kept together by a strong bond of emotional sense of closeness. Individuals were here open toward one another and could count on one another’s help and support. The world outside of that circle was hostile, cold and alien.
Together with the onset of market economy Poles, Czechs and Hungarians – despite all the difficulties connected with the process of social transformation – manage to overcome the above type of social divisions much more successfully than in Belarus or Ukraine. Nonetheless, the capital which founded the basis on which market economies and civil societies were built in the West was lacking in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and that caused major transformation chaos in the sphere of economy, politics, and social norms. Inability to rely on durable principles of social order brings about a tendency to order the existing chaos. It is done so through, on the one hand, development of bureaucratic structures of state administration, and, on the other hand, through linking business with these bureaucratic structures. Both tendencies are of course incompatible with the task of building civil society. The phenomenon is much more observable in the east of Europe, in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. In Russia and Ukraine it already led to the emergence of oligarchies in the politico-economic spheres.
A vital role in the process was played out by collective identity of societies of that part of Europe, which is of course a crucial element of social capital. In many aspects Poland is in a way suspended in-between the West and the eastern-Slavic East. The disintegration of Belarusian and Ukrainian societies was – for many reasons – went much deeper than it did for the Polish, Czech, or Hungarian societies. It seems also, that the identity of Belarusians and Ukrainians is weaker in general, and particularly in some of its aspects. Both societies (with the exception of Western Ukraine) are characterized by a weakly formed national consciousness, and by a strongly developed class consciousness in its social dimension. Private identity is in these societies definitely weaker than social identity. An individual looks at oneself through the group context. The masses are driven by a tradition of condemning those who move ahead of the line. The reasons for such attitudes stem from the peasant descent of these societies, from 70 years of communist rule, and from the influences of the Russian culture. The lack of a strong bourgeoisie tradition, of protestant ethics of work, of a real experience of modern capitalism – all of these are accompanied by the strong tendency to ideologize and mythologize the surrounding reality and divisions within it, as well as common social anomie.
This is the background for representing the concrete aspects of Belarusian and Ukrainian identity, by obvious reasons choosing only some of them.
The identity of societies I am discussing here is unique in relation to other European nations in that it is characterized by a strong sense of togetherness, unknown to the Western Slavs, Germanic and Roman nations of Western Europe. The concept of ‘me – ‘russkij’ [Russian] strongly binds Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians1. Russians imposed on the two other nations such a vision of history in which they are the most important and developed element of the tradition of Kievan Rus, its direct inheritors, uniting and leading the two other components of the triad. Orthodox Christianity became an important element of Russianness, and the Muscovy state nominated itself its ancient protector. The tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and that of the Commonwealth was radically limited and manipulated, or even rejected as opposed to the national and state interest of Moscow. ‘We – Russians’ – this is how in many situations the inhabitants of Minsk, Kiev and Moscow speak about themselves, adding at the same time ‘we – Slavs’, which once distinguished them and even elevated from all other nations of the USSR. This Slavic component is often underlined in contacts with Poles or Czechs, as if representatives of these two nations were not Slavs themselves. This lack of self-reflexivity of communal references (which indicates how strong they remain) is also frequently manifested in the category of ‘we – Orthodox’ (which means true Christians), in opposition to the alien (non-Christian?) Catholics and Protestants. The Eastern-Slavic world of Russianness, built, or at least powerfully reinforced by Russians in opposition to the West, is in consequence a relatively closed world, creating barriers where in the rest of Europe they do not exist any more, or are very weak. It seriously limits the possibilities of state and national emancipation of Belarusians and Ukrainians, and makes them dependent on categories of social division diminished in Western Europe for generations now (e.g. we – Orthodox, local, or ‘me- Orthodox atheist’), and frequently in fact makes them dependent on Moscow. As a consequence of several centuries, today’s Ukrainianness of Kiev (and Belarusianness of Minsk) is more an adaptation of Russianness to local conditions than a continuation of culture of old Ruthenian dukedoms and later politico-cultural communities in those territories. Russianness resembles Arabic culture to an extent. For both, communities were built which prevented the possibility of forming separate nations within the frameworks of respective imperial systems. The national emancipation of Ukrainians emerged in confrontation with Polishness in eastern Galicia and Volhynia. By contrast, in Ukraine dominated by Russians the process was incomparably weaker. We can also observe that Belarusians who come to study in Poland, facing fully nationalized Poles – people with strongly founded cultural and language (in its national context) identity, start to ask themselves questions about their identity often for the first time in their lives: who am I? what determines my identity? And these are more often than not the first beacons of national awareness. It does not happen so while studying in Moscow.
What is even more interesting, Russianness in Ukrainian and Belarusian territories has an additional ethnic aspect absent from ethnic Russians, and it denotes ethnic Belarusianness and Ukrainianness. Sometimes it can take on national forms. The term ‘we-Russians’ is not, despite its ambiguity, equivalent to either, because it has a state and citizenship dimension, not ethnic-national. Thus, an inhabitant of Moscow who says ‘me-Russkij’ [Russian] refers to the category which includes the people of Minsk and Kiev, but, in contrast to Belarusians and Ukranians, he does not have a category at hand which would distinguish him nationally from other Eastern Slavic nations. The term ‘Grand Russian’ is already archaic. Would this be, then, a symptom of Russian imperial mentality, of the tendency to subordinate Ukrainians and Belarusians even on the level of terminology (sub-consciousness)? What testifies to the ambiguity of the term ‘Russianness’ is the fact that in censuses carried out in Belarus and Ukraine the Russian minority is described as ‘russkije’ and not ‘rossijanie’, because the latter term has been already radically narrowed down to denote the citizens of Russia or its fresh émigrés (who still feel a bond to their country). So, depending on situation, one can be Russian [russkij] in opposition to Belarusianness or underline one’s Russianness as a concept broader than Belarusianness, in which case Belarusianness will be a component of Russianness.
Social divisions occurring now in Minks or Kiev: ‘we – Russians [russkije]’ and ‘them – alien’ do not implicate the existence of fully developed national points of reference. They are a manifestation of Sovietness (now existing without the USSR) in its Russian cultural and language form. It seems probable that the process of national and state emancipation of Belarusians and Ukrainians will be associated with the process of weakening of terminological and conceptual Russianness. The process of emancipation will probably start at the level of business and political elites competing with their Moscow-Petersburg counterparts. An awareness of conflict of interest must lie at the foundations of this process. We can suspect that the process will emerge in Ukraine sooner than in Belarus (assuming that both nation-states will endure). Some facts provide an evidence that the process has already started.
Sovietization, the main factor building modern Belarusian and Ukrainian societies (without the latter’s western part), but also determining the identity of local Russians, is the reason why both discussed countries of the former USSR underwent a different course of development than Yugoslavia. Sovietization was the main obstacle to the low level of national awareness of both societies discussed. In Yugoslavia, the conflict had a strongly national character. Ukrainian and Belarusian identity was infused with social concerns and values, and these are equally important to Russians inhabiting the provinces. That is why the emergence of Ukraine and Belarus did not cause so much aggression when compared to Yugoslavia. Inhabitants of Russian Smolensk region wondered, after Belarus became an independent country, if it would not be better to become a part of the Belarusian state, where at that time the standard of living was higher. The power of Russianness linking all people of Eastern Slavic nations proved to be much stronger than the power of Yugoslavness promoted by Belgrad2. What is more interesting, is that the Russian population settled in the Baltic republics in the second half of 20th c, as a result of colonial conquest did not, after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia gained independence, return to their countries – like Germans, who left the Zamo region after they had been colonizing it during ... but, driven by social reasons and counting on support from Russia remained in these countries, frequently living off pensions and benefits worked out by local population which governs their country in a much better and efficient way3.
Orthodox Christianity is the essence of Russianness. It does not mean, however, that only believers could belong to that community. Both Belarusians and Russians, and Ukrainians to a lesser extent, are mostly atheists or agnostics, people indifferent to religion. However, their sense of descending from the Orthodox community is much stronger than similar references among European Catholic or Protestant societies. It is indeed hardly probable that a given political leaser from Central or Eastern Europe make a claim that he or she is a Catholic or Protestant atheist. A statement of the kind would have a humorous effect. Orthodoxy – treated historically and understood as a culture and not the actual faith in God – draws the borders for a cultural sphere traditionally perceived as different from the Latin cultural sphere. Religious loyalties are much stronger among today’s Orthodox populations of Europe than among Latin circles. Such bond is determining for taking sides in social conflicts, as it is assumed that they have religious foundations. So, sides taken in the conflict are an outcome of somebody’s religious belonging. The Russian-Orthodox identity remains inherently at a distance from the Latin societies of Europe west of the Bug river. Europe is associated with wealth, and often with a better organized social life, but this is Russianness which is truly deep and valuable. The West is traditionally perceived as culturally shallow and materialistic. After the collapse of the USSR the attitudes toward the West are undulating, different for respective social strata and influenced by international events. The Russianness is shaped by, apart from the richness of cultural features characteristic for the Orthodox Church (e.g. the Orthodox mysticism), the heritage of Byzantium – social hierarchies, ceremonies and bureaucratization of social life, as well as the Tatar attitude toward power. Many of these features are much stronger among Russians than Ukrainian or Belarusian societies. These societies, after all, were under the influence of the West for many centuries, and in Volhynia and Western Ukraine even more so.
Self-perception in the East-West category is much closer to Russians than Belarusians and Ukrainians. The Russians feel strongly different from the West, and it is even a source of pride for them (accompanied by a range of complexes). They sometimes perceive this distinctiveness of theirs in civilizational categories, at the same time admitting to Europeanness. Bealrusians and Ukrainians, although they belong to the same cultural sphere as Russians, are more suspended between East and West. Their history was for centuries a part of the history of Europe, and even a part of the history of Latin Catholicism (after the Brest Union). Anyway, the relative weakness of the debate concerning the above matter in Belarus can be contrasted with a massive literature on the subject in Ukraine. As Ola Hnatiuk writes: ‘Discussions about Ukraine between East and West are waged with changeable zeal by humanists and strategists in geopolitics. It enabled historians to revise Ukrainian history thoroughly, as, on the one hand, they were able to abandon an ethnocentric vision of history and, on the other, to break away from the tradition of Russian or Soviet (Ukrainian and Russian) historiography. Writers, in turn, which is a bit surprising, prefer to speak about belonging (or efforts to belong) to the European culture, instead of remaining on the crossroads and intersections of two influences and civilizations. The formula of in-betweenness is more popular among politicians who, using it, are trying to give their utterances an air of geostrategic considerations”4. Hnatiuk is writing here about two clashing visions of Ukraine. The first describes Ukraine as a culture of the borderland, mixing characteristics of both east and west, and bridging the two. The second treats Ukraine as a field where two conflicting, indeed hostile and alien civilizations clash. ‘The first is characterized by a conviction that the Ukrainian culture was constituted by being in-between, and as such it is best prepared for the role of a mediator. The second, in turn, rests on a key conviction of the particular and undervalued role of Ukraine as the defender of European values and of the unquestioned cultural superiority of the West. This stance is defined by a clearly negative attitude toward the East, understood as Russia, with stereotypical features commonly ascribed to it – the ‘Asiatic’ despotism, cruelty, yielding to primitive instincts etc.). The adherents to the first vision of Ukraine underline the presence of various components in their culture and make this diversity a value. In the second option the argument for Ukraine as belonging the West prevails, and it is accompanied by the rhetoric of the ‘return to Europe’5. In yet a third vision the East, encountering in Ukraine the West, does not create a new quality, but splits the Ukrainian identity. A fourth vision weaves Ukraine into the fabric of Western culture, while the fifth places Ukraine in the very heart of Europe. ‘All these conceptions are bound together by the feeling of estrangement in relation to the European culture, although it is of a different weight for each’6. Reflections on the geopolitical and cultural rifts within Ukraine are accompanied by studies on Ukraine as a postcolonial country and society, in which case the western categories worked out in the process of studying postcolonial countries are transferred onto the local conditions. This type of research and discussion is practically absent from Belarus.
Ukrainian intellectual elites are undoubtedly inspired by Western thought. The traditions of manifesting their Ukrainian nationality – which means separateness and independence from Russians – had a deeper rooting in this society than in Belarus. The only quoted work treating on Belarus as a clash between east and west is by a 25-year author Ihnat Abdziralowicz (Kanczewski) from 1921, and intellectually not very inspiring for that matter7. This is so not only the present political conditions in Belarus, but also the virtual absence of such debates in the past, which places Belarus in the position of a transitory category between Poland and Russia. It is also because of the weakness of Belarusian elites in general, and national elites in particular, as well as the lack of the tradition of conflicts with neighbors which could provide a basis for the process of the nation forming, and launch national self-awareness on one’s distinctiveness and place in this particular place in Europe. It is also a bit of a burden for the Orthodox in its majority society that the creators of its modern literature, as well as of a vital part of their national movement, were Catholics (additionally, Catholicism was identified in Russia with Polishness and it is only in recent years that this interdependence has been disassociated), and even today their representatives in the opposition is clearly visible.
The identity of Ukrainian elites (and especially of the Western Ukraine society) is much more developed than that of the Belarusian people; their historical awareness is more complete, with factography immersed in emotions, and with strongly delineated sense of cultural separateness with its religious form (the Uniate Church today and the Orthodox Church during the 1st Commonwealth, especially during the archbishop Mohyla). Wodzimierz Pawluczuk points out here at various attitudes of the opposition in Belarus and Ukraine respectively, prior to the upcoming collapse of the USSR and soon after. ‘The national-democratic movement at that period is much more developed in Ukraine than in Belarus. What the most important, however, is that in Ukraine it is ‘internalized’ in the national tradition, invigorated by the remembrance and tradition of the Cossack culture, founded in the ‘Ukrainian’ religion, which is the Uniate Church, on the ‘heroic’ tradition of the UPA [Ukrainian Resistance Army] and the OUN ideology elevating the Ukrainian nation to an absolute, sacred category, as well as a large number of dissidents fighting for the national cause during communism (including those who even in the 60s were shot or sentenced to many years of imprisonment). It is more difficult to find in Belarus the martyrs for the national cause and fighters ready to spare their life for it’8.
Despite such differences between national identity of Ukrainians and Belarusians, both societies are closely related to each other (with the exception of Western Ukraine) and clearly distinct from the Hungarians, Czechs and Poles. Modern Belarusian and Ukrainian societies were built on the Soviet, not national, values. As a consequence of that process, the masses perceive their distinctiveness from Russians in regional rather than national categories. These are ethnographic and folkloric differences in which the sense of the value of one’s own culture, language and history is relatively weak. The vision of own state independence stems most frequently from the republican tradition of the USSR, which results in the stable percent several dozen to accept the possibility of returning to the federacy with Russia (which does not mean, however, the acceptance of melting in the structures of the Russian Federation). A remarkable part of both societies identifies themselves with sovietized Russianness: in Belarus – within the category of Western Russianness, an idea stemming from 19th c. and subsequently modified; in Ukraine – within the category of ‘Malorossiia’. It is also the Soviet identity that determines their attitude toward culture (of secondary importance in relation to the needs of everyday life), to social structure (the peasant foundation of both societies is underlined and all elitist trends condemned), to time (tendency to live in the here and now), attitude toward property, liberty and authority. On the level of the people the unwillingness to introduce ‘capitalist fancies’ is very strong. Market economy and democracy are viewed with suspicion. On a contemporary picture a man dressed western-fashion names ‘Mr. Democrat’ escapes through the window, and a Ukranian wife dressed in folk costume opens her arms to the husband, also dressed in folk fashion: ‘My husband (cholovik) came back”9. President Lukaszenka ironically uses the title ‘Pan’ [Mr.] referring to a person from the Belarusian oppositional circles10. In both cases the ‘Mr.’ Symbolizes alien values. Democracy is alien because, as it is often maintained, it brings about chaos (unnecessary conflicts and rows). Market economy is also unwelcome, because it brings with it poverty of many and wealth for only a narrow margin of the population. National concerns are likewise alien, because the Soviet people associate them with nationalism, fascism, conflicts and lack of tolerance. Speaking publicly in Belarusian is considered nationalist, especially for the inhabitants of Belarusian cities, mostly Russian-speaking. Professor Adam Maldzis, a well-known Belarusian literary scholar, says: ‘Recently I had a guest, father Aleksander Nadson, who is director of Belarusian library and museum in London. We were walking in Minsk. Two young men sat beside us at a bus stop. When they realized we were talking in Belarusian, they took the matter right into their hands: ‘are you cruising for bruising?’11. Such a situation would not occur in Western Ukraine, but the eastern parts of that country are sovietized to a comparable extent. The Russian language was the carrier of Soviet modernity. It was also the language of social advancement for the masses. That is why the literary form of Belarusian and Ukrainian was frequently associated with a different – and to a large extent hostile – system of values forming the societies of modern Europe. The sense of cultural inferiority of the Belarusian or Ukrainian language in relation to Russian is common. As Sokrat Janowicz wrote in 1989: ‘A Belarusian literary journal published as a journal of translations from Belarusian into Russian sells 20 times more than the same edition in the original’12. The process of the depreciation of local culture is so advanced now that it has not been thus far possible to reverse it in independent Belarus. As a Hungarian slavist Andras Zoltan observes – in the first edition of the Belarusian ‘Dictionary of borrowed terms’ (published in Minsk in 1993), borrowings from Russian are not included, because they are not considered alien any more 13.
A contemporary Ukrainian or Belarusian, stating his cultural and social belonging, does so placing himself within the set of values delineated above. They are determining for his sense of identity. And this is an identity of the people more than of the elites (especially that the latter are diverse anyway), and more so in Belarus than in Ukraine (and in Ukraine more so in the east than in the Dnieper regions, not to mention the western parts of the country). Often, and many years after regaining independence by both societies, you could hear how a Belarusian or a Ukrainian in Poland would refer to the Russian sports team from Volgograd or another Russian city as ‘our team, or ‘our president’ when referring to Boris Yeltsin. The Russians in those two countries are not usually considered a national minority (again with the exception of Western Ukraine). The Russian community keeps a distance from Belarusianness and Ukrainianness, opting rather for the Soviet identity form of the USSR type, than its present nation-state Russianness. The Soviet model integrates within the framework of Russianness, while nationalism isolates from at least some sections of the society, and as such may generate conflicts. Moreover, local Russians are often what we would call Soviet russkije rather than fully nationally identified Russians according to the western categories (although the latter are also quite numerous). The transitions between the three nationalities are frequently fluid, liable to changing social conditions (e.g. recently the number of Russians in Ukraine visibly diminished). Symbolic of the transitional identity are the languages – trasianka in Belarus and surzhyk in Ukraine.
A sociological survey carried out in Ukraine in 1997 gave the respondents several options to choose from while determining their identity. Here are the results14:
‘I consider myself:
– only Ukrainian 56%
– only Russian 11%
– both Russian and Ukrainian 27%
– more a Ukrainian than Russian 7%
– equally Ukrainian and Russian 11%
– more Russian than Ukrainian 5%
The transitory forms are the most characteristic for the urbanized and industrialized regions of south-easter Ukraine, which means where the dystrophy of traditional social structures was the strongest, and new forms founded of Sovietness were built. We can suppose that in Belarus such transitory forms – applying the analogous terminology – would be less numerous. It results from a relatively more thorough insulation and also stability of the Belarusian society. Also because the word ‘Belarusian’ has a stronger regional and ethnic meaning (it was a topographic distinction for long enough), used regardless of how deeply the Belarusianness in a region is infused with Russianness. Thus, the national dimension of this word is rather insignificant. It means belonging to this particular region, and not some clearly delineated in emotional terms and strongly ideologized cultural option, especially not national for that matter. So, the relative narrow range of transitory forms between Russianness and Belarusians may pertain to the fact that the notion of a Belarusian as a person has not got immediate national connotations. It designates more an awareness of the localness than the richness of content (e.g. national content). What is also significant is the fact that fewer Russians live in Belarus today than in Ukraine, and most of them settled there after anyway.
From the point of view of a typical, fully nationalized European, the national identity of Belarusians and Ukrainians today is determined by an eclectic complex of mutually contradictory values, ideas, historical heroes and political stances. Events of mutually opposed ideological meaning are celebrated alongside each other. We have to be aware, however, that such a contradiction becomes apparent only if adopt the national principle of ordering social reality. Auch a principle, however, is alien to most Ukrainians and Belarusians, and does not in fact have to be considered normative. Janowicz writes: ‘Today’s republic of Belarus is mentally a vestige of the USSR. Its formal independence is perceived by a decisive majority of citizens as a bad joke of history. This feeling of being sentenced to sovereignty has all features of permanence’15. Next he states: ‘Belarus is a social, and not national, republic’16.
What is important for both societies and determines the character of community for them is that both lack a vision of the future Belarusianness or Ukrainianness, although to a lesser degree. They clearly lack a vision of the state, nation, system – anything which would be an equivalent of Polish ‘glass houses’. At the moment Poland also does not hold such a vision of its future, but, on the other hand, it is in a completely different moment of its historical development. Such visions were developed in breakthrough moments of Polish history. They mobilized the society to be active, to sacrifice, and gave hope. The goals were utopian, but Poland was thanks to them great and beautiful (in spirit, but not only). The lack of such visions is weighing down on Belarusians especially. The weakness of intellectual debates, lack of a serious reflection on the position of Belarus in contemporary Europe, difficulties with finding a place for the country among social, cultural, political and economic trends in the continent – this all sentences Belarus to provinciality17. Both Belarusians and Ukrainians to a lesser degree, make an impression of being large conglomerates of loosely connected individuals rather than solid communities.
Belarusian and Ukrainian hierarchized community can be ordered in three narrowing down circles. The first circle contains the eastern-Slavic Russianness. The second, contained within the larger framework of the first, contains the regional-state-cultural Belarusianness and Ukrainianness, subordinated of course to the first category. We can add that the second circle describes the slowly emancipating category, especially at the level of the elites. The third contains strong references to the region, pertaining especially to Ukraine. There is no equivalent of the first in Poland. The second circle has a completely different character in Poland – it has a form of the superior nation-state value. The third is much weaker in Poland in comparison to Ukraine. Some surveys show that regional belonging differentiates their attitudes toward language, history and the issue of political independence, to economic questions and territory inhabited than does the national identification – being a Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet, or just belonging to the language18. According to data from 2000, ‘only 35% of respondents consider themselves Ukrainian citizens, and 39% identifies themselves mainly with the place of living (the city, village, region), further 10% with the former USSR and others’19. Regionalism is a vital dividing force of independent Ukraine. As Jaroslaw Hrycak writes: ‘In highly urbanized and industrialized regions of eastern Ukraine inhabited by a consolidated Russian and Russian-speaking population, the communist and leftist parties are widely popular. In the western part of Ukraine, where ethnic Ukrainian population is a majority, political success is in the hands of democratic parties, independent politicians and moderate nationalists. In the western regions a total independence from Russia is preferred, while the east opts for closer links with that country. Such differences are clear also in political culture: the west is more enduring and consistent in its politics, enjoying a strong political mobilization. The east seems to be more unwilling to support long-term political nations and concentrates mainly on social problems’20. Sociological research carried out in mid-90s (1994 and 1996) among inhabitants of Donietsk and Lviv picture the differences between those two large regions of Ukraine. The table below contains answers to the questions: ‘How important, in your opinion, were the following events in the history of Ukraine?’21:
Very significant Lviv Donietsk
Kievan Rus 72.7 77.2
Cossack period 74.1 45.9
Pereiaslav Agreement (1654) 33.4 77.7
National Republic of Ukraine 67.5 23.2
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic 19.8 59.7
Proclamation of independence by Ukraine in 1991 90.4 28.0
As the above data show, Lviv is in its historical awareness more pro-national, and Donietsk more pro-Soviet. For 62% of Lviv Ukrainian independence is the most important, and will to reunite with Russia occupies one of the lowest positions in the table, while in Donietsk 57% respondents would wish for a new ‘reunion’. 74.4% inhabitants of Lviv estimate the political changes occurring in Ukraine after gaining independence as positive or very positive. In turn, 88.2% of Donietsk inhabitants view the changes as decidedly negative. But even in Donietsk not a significant percentage of the population would be a decided opponent of independence. It was condition on the state’s efficiency. Ukraine would be perceived as existing between Europe and Russia, closer, though, to the latter. The Donietsk population, when asked about territory (country) with which it would identify itself, pointed at Russia at first, instead of Ukraine. What is, however, very significant, is that very few – 1% of Lviv inhabitants and 5% of Donietsk inhabitants – accepted the possibility of dividing Ukraine into several separate states. So, despite huge regional differences, the tendency to follow one common for all direction, regardless of what it would be, is strong in Ukraine. This is if we assume that the survey was representative for the whole Ukraine, possibly with the exception of Crimea. The inhabitants of Donietsk saw the Ukrainian nation in more political categories, while the inhabitants of Lviv more in ethnic categories. Donietsk opted also against Ukrainian as the official language, underlining at the same time strong cultural and historical bonds with Russia. The Lviv inhabitants were willing to admit that everybody should take care of oneself, while in Donietsk the government was more frequently viewed as a guarantee of social security package22. Supposedly, the existing rifts in the identity of Ukrainians could be significantly alleviated by economic and social successes of the young state. However, the necessity that the authorities faced to maneuver between radically different postulates of a diverse electorate is the reason why superior interests are not pursued, why there are no decisive reforms, and why so much inertia or ineffective action.
Regional divisions of Belarus into the eastern and western part are much less significant than in Ukraine, although they also exist. A well-known Belarusian publicist Sarhiej Astraucou writes about these divisions in an article ‘Uschodniki i zachodniki’, in a Minsk journal Kurjer (May 2000)23. He ascribes to the ‘zachodniki’ – ‘westerners’ – a deeper love of freedom, active efforts for sustaining own statehood, notices that a lot of activists of the opposition come from the west, especially its leaders, and points out the use of the Belarusian language, according to the census of 1999, is much more frequently used in the west of the country. He enumerates other features he considers characteristic for the west: patriotism, lesser nostalgia for the USSR and its institutions, including federation with Russia, and religiousness. So, as the author observes, the inhabitants of the eastern parts of Belarus yield more to the category of ‘Soviet Belarusians’. Inhabitants of the western regions are more wealthy, gain bigger wages (in farming even twice as much as in the east), and kovhoz enterprises are much more efficient and have better equipment 24. Crime statistics are much higher in the east, and in the west the law is more respected. The AIDS occurs more frequently in the east and Astraucou explains its scarce presence in the west by a strong influence of the Church, quoting an opinion of local doctors. According to opinion polls carried out by the NOWAK and referred to by the author, 14% of ‘zachodniki’ accepts the possibility of joining the NATO, while the acceptance for the above does not exceed 1.5% in the Mohylew region in the east. What is interesting that both groups are unanimous regarding land ownership.
The identities of Belarusian and Ukrainian societies are in many respects similar to each other, even considering the existing differences. Analogies can be found among the inhabitants of the eastern regions of both communities. They also occur for the western part of Belarus and the Right Bank Ukraine. Belarus lacks, however, a fully nationalized society, like that in Western Ukraine, developed under the influence of the Polish and Austrian culture. Both these societies were for centuries under the influence of two powerful – and remarkably different – cultures: European from the west (in its Polish layout), and Russian from the east. They carried with themselves different, and often contradictory, sets of values. The range of values coming from the west is determined in Ukraine, both chronologically and territorially, by dates of the Commonwealth’s withdrawals: 1667, 1772, 1939. A simple enumeration of oppositional values25 and ascribing them to the cultural circles (or civilization, as Huntington maintains) clashing in the territories discussed here, would result in gross simplifications. We should surely avoid a judgmental attitude and consider them good or evil. The fate of the Ukrainian and Belarusian societies laid in the hands of others for several generations. Hence the weak development of those features which elsewhere allowed other nations to exist as communities capable of apt management of their state and economy. Anyway, in both cases the new state borders necessitate the process of change that both societies have to undergo, a process that is so fascinating for historians, political scientists, and, especially, sociologists.
Translated by Dorota Koodziejczyk
1 It does not mean, however, that ‘Russianness’ is a term referred to by the masses of both societies. Regardless of the degree of community bonding between the three societies, at least the two of them (Ukrainian and Belarusian) are internally diverse in the way they accept the term: territorially, socially (social strata), and situationally. Despite of these differences, in confrontation with others, the Eastern-Slavic community bonding, resting on history, culture, religion, and 20th c. shared experience of the Soviet state, is drawn with clear lines. And sometimes it is indeed expressed in the from of ‘me-Russkij’, which is quite ambiguous as to its content.
2 Which does not exclude local animosities and even conflicts. An example of that is the recent conflict with Ukraine about Crimea, incited periodically by Moscow. It seems also that the significance of elites in the process
of popularizing nationalist attitudes is remarkable in Russia, unlike in Poland or Hungary, where the process of the development of national identity was deeper, and occurred through the grassroots national self-organization.
3 The Russian population traditionally perceived its presence in the Baltic republics within the social-imperial framework (they would not realize its role of an occupier), and not in national – requiring the categories of dignity and honor. The Russian population surrenders to pressure and is leaving the Asiatic republics, being thrown away from them or looking for new opportunities elsewhere. What seems vital in the process is that after the October Revolution the tsarist elites were destroyed, and the code of honor together with them. The code of honor that emulated European patterns stemming from the chivalric tradition, absent from Russia.
4 O. Hnatiuk, Pożegnanie z imperium. Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości. Lublin, 2003, p. 32 (also 231-284).
5 Ibidem, p. 233.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ι. Àáäç³ðàëîâ³÷, Àäâå÷íûì øëÿõàì. Äàñüëåäç³íû áåëàðóñêàãà ñüâåòàãëÿäó, Ìåíñê 1993
8 W. Pawluczuk, Ukraina. Polityka i mistyka. Kraków, 1998, p. 97.
9 Picture in A. Wilson: Ukraicy. Transl. by M. Urbański, Warszawa 2002, p. 198.
10 Interview for the Belarusian section of the radio ‘Svaboda’, in: .
11 M. Rębacz: Białoruś: biją opozycję, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25.06.2003 [www.wyborcza.pl]
12 S. Janowicz, Bialoruś i Polska – małżeństwo z rozsądku. In: Janowicz: Ojczystość. Białoruskie ślady i znaki. Selected and edited by Robert Traba, Olsztyn 2001, p. 120.
13 A. Zoltan, Rec.: A.M.Áóëûêà, Ñëî¢íiê ³íøàìî¢íûõ ñëî¢. ̳íñê: «Íàðîäíàÿ àñâåòà» 1993, p. 398, in: Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, vol. 40, Budapest 1995, pp. 392-396.
14 A. Wilson, op.cit., p. 232.
15 S. Janowicz, ‘Kształtowanie się narodu białoruskiego’, in: Ojczystość..., p. 104.
16 Ibidem.
17 It does not mean, however, that Belarus is an intellectual desert. An interesting journal Arche is an evidence to the contrary.
18 J. Hrycak: ‘Po obu stronach Zbrucza? Regionalizm i tożsamość narodowa na Ukrainie po upadku Związku Sowieckiego’, in: Tematy polsko-ukraińskie. Historia, Literatura, Edukacja, ed. By Robert Traba, Olsztyn 2001, pp. 139-140.
19 M. Riabczuk, Od Małorosji do Ukrainy. Introduced and edited by B. Berdychowska, transl. by Hnatiuk and Kotyska, Kraków 2002, p. 37.
20 J. Hrycak, op.cit., p. 127.
21 Ibidem, p. 135.
22 Ibidem, pp. 136-139.
23 Ñ. Àñòðà¢öî¢, Óñõîäí³ê³ i çàõîäí³ê³, „Êóð’åð” 2000, nr 2, s. 14-15
24 C. Goliński, ‘Do lemieszy!’, Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 95, 21.04.2000, p. 26 – the author writes that in the Witebsk region bordering with Russia 81% of farming estates brought losses, and in the Grodno region only 17%.
25 For example: Sovietness (class domination) vs. nation; collectivism vs. individualism; enslavement vs. liberty, rule from without vs. rule from within.
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