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 Liavon BARSZCZEŰSKI
Belarusian P.E.N.-Center
THE RECURRENCES OF THE PAST OR THE POST-SOVIET MEDIA-CRACY
In the book “L’explosion de la communication” (The Explosion of Communication”), now also available in Belarusian, authors Philippe Breton and Serge Proulx wrote:
“The legitimacy of the power in our liberal society is now ensured by the eloquence of mass media: the ability to use the mass media is becoming a necessary precondition for success in politics. The significance, which public opinion polls and advertising have attained while shaping an image of a public figure, leads to the growing value of a fact of communication against its content. After all, it is not important what a candidate talks about during an electoral campaign. It is important, though, that he/she is perceived as a person who wants to tell something, ideally, in a form of a friendly dialogue. Political advertising in this case obviously ensures an expansion of the dominant communication ideology in the society”. (Breton Ph., Proulx S. The Explosion of Communication // Translated from French. —Minsk, 1995, —p. 135—134).
In this work by authors, who live in a democratic society, we can see the actual recognition of the fact that this society is no longer democratic, but, to a very large extent, is a mediacratic one. It means that the currently all-powerful media determine the nature of the power as well as the methods of realizing its function. One can put it differently: the power is formally elected by a civil society, yet in reality, this choice is pre-determined by the work of the media. Let us not forget that we are talking about a society, shaped evolutionary and based on a democratic development trend. Tradition — the sustainability of political tastes of smaller communities (e.g. family); finding time by an average man to read politics sections in a newspaper; and first of all, the trust that his choice matters for his concrete daily life in the future — also puts a significant influence on the political choice of a member of such a society.
Are the described factors present in the consciousness of an average man in a post-Soviet society? The research, conducted by political scientist and political psychologist Uladzimir Padhol with our modest participation (in: Padhol U. Political Psychology Basics. Materials for People’s University students. —Minsk, 1999), allows us to talk about a special totalitarian mentality of a Belarusian — a person who unexpectedly found itself in the post-Soviet epoch.
MENTALITY is a notion, which reflects a combination of complicated motivational complexes and actual actions of a human being. The presence of psychological structures and orientations, which people are not always aware of, is the deep-laid basis of any mentality. Such structures and orientations are thoroughly analyzed in the works of E. Fromm (e.g. in: Fromm E. Escape from Freedom. —New York, 1941 or in: Fromm E. A Man for Himself. —Minsk, 1992).
By influencing on a person ideologically, totalitarian system aims to turn people into sadomasochists, who get pleasure from obeying the system or from holding the fates of their subordinates. The system aims to override a human being completely. To do so, it destroys culture and estranges a human being from it, creating a totalitarian subculture instead. The system shapes in the souls of those subdued an aggressive attitude and a destructive orientation towards the dissent.
The eradication of national culture as a meta-language and the language itself along with its sub-cultural hypnotic layer (sayings, greetings, curses, jokes) can be compared with eradication of humus, which, as it is known, has built up for millions of years. While humus contains all the elements necessary for plants, hypnotic layer of the national sub-culture fosters the socialization of an individual and its transformation into a personality. Without this layer, only mankurts grow, becoming “the soldiers of the empire” after being exposed to a proper ideological brainwashing.
Every historic epoch and every society shape their mentality structure. One can judge about the fundamental elements of the mentality of Belarusians in the Great Duchy of Litva from the statements by philosopher and publicist A.Volian: “Freedom is the most beautiful people’s thing. Slavery is even worse than death” (A quote from: Saverchanka I. Book and Writing Culture of Belarus. —Minsk, 1998, —p. 60). Volian gave examples when “people voluntarily opted for death in order not to get into captivity”. And he connected the notion of “freedom” with “law”: “There is no freedom where there is no law”.
Many wars have since swept across Belarus. The authority and ideologies, which, however, often turned out to be alien and aggressive, changed. Over the past several centuries, the Belarusian nation has become an object of destroying influence from four mentally foreign systems:
1. Russian tsarism, which carried out genocide during aggressive wars, in which every second Belarusian perished; after the occupation and partition of the Great Duchy of Litva, they also started eradicating the Belarusian identity at both state and cultural level.
2. Interwar Poland. The policy of Polonization and erasing Belarusian identity from people’s memory.
3. Germany under Hitler. Genocide.
4. Soviet Russia. Genocide and eradication of ethnic intelligentsia and culture followed by a total transformation of the mentality towards creating “a new community of people — the Soviet people”.
In 1986 we observed genocide again, with children sent to a May Day demonstration under the Chernobyl X-rays, with Moscow-bound radioactive clouds downed on Mahileu province. As a result, physical and spiritual existence of Belarusians has been placed under threat.
Today we can also talk about hypnotic information technologies, with the help of which specific consciousness and sub-consciousness structures are being imposed on the nation. Normally, it is a two-way process. First, national sub-culture with its traditionally formed and peculiar hypnotic elements is eradicated. Secondly, people are imposed the qualities, which they have allegedly possessed since the very dawn of the nation (tolerance, gentleness, etc.). Ideological myths and social idols are the means of hypnotic influence on the nation’s mentality.
It is natural for modern Belarusians to have many elements of totalitarian and post-totalitarian mentality, which has taken shape under the influence of the double totalitarian system. This includes the national totalitarism of eastern neighbors, which aims to destroy the Belarusian culture and sub-culture, and convince Belarusians that they, in fact, are the same as Russians, and the colonial totalitarism, the function of which is to annex Belarus as a state to the imperial Russia. That is where a stubborn struggle of the totalitarian system against the rebirth of the Belarusian language and culture comes from. At the same time, authentic features of Belarusian mentality, which are still preserved deep in the consciousness and genetic memory of national culture bearers do exist.
The main characteristic features of the mentality of a large part of our compatriots include:
• an absolute domination of irrational belief, first of all, in political miracles;
• the fear of losing — as a result of participation in the political life — their prosperity (although, minimal), health, even life;
• feeling themselves unprotected from the state machinery;
• the lack of will and action, which can change the situation;
• the lack of trust in their own forces;
• isolation in the world of their personal problems;
• hostile attitude to the attempts of other members of the society to organize themselves;
• aggressiveness directed in the first place at the people who do not fear and who do not follow the majority, etc.
Many opposition politicians and publicists are committing a serious mistake by misunderstanding and ignoring in their actions the above-mentioned features of the mentality of a post-Soviet Belarusian, or in romanticizing its image. It appears that under the influence of humanistic literature, which we read in a high school, a university and upon graduation, we tend to think that a large part of our compatriots can go beyond a usual pragmatism and be filled with idealism in a positive sense of the word. However, political psychologists have quite convincingly exhibited that ideological myths in the mentality are of an extremely solid nature, and it is not easy to change them.
Apparently, here should we seek answers to the questions from our recent political past and reality. Let us recall some of them. For instance, why did not the 12 April 1995 severe beating of Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) deputies in the parliament building cause a public outcry from our citizens? On the contrary, BPF politicians gained less support in the parliamentary elections, which took place one month after the beating. I also wonder why the majority of population did not support a humanistic program of Uladzimir Hancharyk, the opposition single candidate who based his campaign on the disappearances of high-profile opposition figures. Finally, why do the circulation of opposition papers, which polls suggest people trust not less than the regime’s newspapers, keep going down, while the circulation of state-sponsored publications remain quite stable?
I will try to answer these questions generally, on the assumption of those ideological myths common for the mentality of a large portion of Belarusian population. Belarusian citizens treat any power as an instrument of pressure and violence over a human being. They irrationally do not believe that the authority would take an initiative of doing something good and useful for them. They treat any authority as being an occupational one, which is mortally dangerous to touch upon or to make it pay special attention to you. At the same time, it is not shameful to deceive or fool it. It is also good to be close to the power, again in order to solve your private problems or at least neutralize part of threats, which such an authority bears. Furthermore, any other person, not connected to you or your relatives, automatically becomes your competitor when he gets into the power system, because he is taking your place, which, at least theoretically, you or your relatives could occupy. That is why the beating of deputies and their forceful eviction from the parliament building or the disappearances of Viktar Hanchar or Yury Zakharanka, is perceived by this part of the population as something natural. For, in their opinion, only the strongest, most brutal and most cunning get a win in their fight for power. The population I am describing now opt to read presidential daily Sovietskaya Belorussia or a Golas Liozninshchyna. And it does NOT read independent Narodnaya Volya or Brest Courier, since the only reason for them to read a newspaper is to forecast (according to the primary source) what they could expect from the authorities and how to avoid potential danger. They cannot find such practical information in Narodnaya Volya or Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta. They simply have neither need nor desire to read about abstract things like “anti-popular regime” or “the need for defending the Belarusian statehood”.
I would also like to draw your attention to basic differences in understanding of a free-society media-cracy and a totalitarian media-cracy, which still looks ahead with confidence in Belarus and several other post-Soviet countries in East Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Though having certain limitations, a western media-cracy still gives a chance to alternative political forces, an alternative political thought to influence on the society. This is achieved thanks to the absence of media monopolization and owing to the functioning of mechanisms (chiefly, at legislative level), which prevent such a monopolization. At the same time, the workings of executive power in Belarus have never aimed at allowing a real development of the free media (especially, electronic) market. On the contrary, they have always aimed at an opposite direction. With this course of events, a democratic perspective of this country’s development has been out of the question. In this regard, coming to power by the revenge totalitarian forces in 1994 was pre-determined. Naturally, a free media market was not created also because only the minority part of Belarusian society had had a need for that back then. Unfortunately, the current situation is hardly more optimistic. Alternative thoughts, expressed on television, radio or in print media have not fitted into the mythologized consciousness of a large portion of our citizens. Those who used to believe (or disbelieve) only, were forced to think by the alternative view on things, and they found it irritating. It is well known that a Soviet person feared the most to face a choice and be responsible for the choice already made. At the same time, the alternative media not only demonstrated this choice, but also forced to take up responsibility against his will.
Why do authorities today allow the existence of some opposition print media, although putting obstacles in their way? Mistaken are those, who think that the authorities are influenced by some humanistic views or by their fear to violate internationally recognized standards. The answer to this question is, by the way, obvious. The print media all together cannot form a serious competition to the state-controlled electronic media.
The current totalitarian media-cracy is primarily an electronic one. Therefore, as long as a narrow circle of the people at power has a possibility of keeping a television “button” under their control, democratic changes in the Belarusian society remain out of the question. The statement — “the struggle with the undemocratic regime” — should be replaced in program proclamations of political forces with the expression — “the liquidation of totalitarian electronic media-cracy”. With the today’s technical potential of the media, this question does not look unresolved. In practice, it requires a huge investment of funds and a more serious engagement of the intellectual potential of our civil society. It is extremely difficult to do, but Belarusians have no other way out, if they really want to see the light in the end of the tunnel.
In this regard, other questions arise. For instance, is the mythologized consciousness of a large portion of our compatriots going to change in the near future? Is creation and dissemination of the new “humanistic” myths the only way of restoring communication with this part of the society? Or, should one “tell the truth and only the truth whatever bitter it is” to this part of the population? Answers to these questions may differ. However, in my understanding, none of the options can be realized in the near future in principle, especially because the totalitarian electronic media-cracy, supported with huge material injections by the current political regime, continues to exist in the country.
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